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Abstract: Recent work in the philosophy of mind and cognitive 
science (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2010a; Clark 2010b; 
Palermos 2014) can help to explain why certain kinds of assertions—
made on the basis of information stored in our gadgets rather than in 
biological memory—are properly criticisable in light of misleading 
implicatures, while others are not.  
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§1.  
John is at a dinner party and wants to appear knowledgeable and cultured, in 
order to impress the others at the table. The after-dinner conversation turns 
to Mozart, a topic with which all (except John) are already familiar. One 
individual at the table insists that of all of Mozart’s piano Sonatas, only Piano 
Sonata No. 14 is in a minor key (i.e., C minor). John knows nothing about 
Mozart, but sees his chance. 
 He discreetly Googles [Mozart + sonata + minor key] from his iPhone under 
the table, locates the Wikipedia page for Mozart, and casually asserts, 
“Actually, when Mozart was in Paris in the summer of 1778, he wrote what 
would become Piano Sonata No. 8—which is, interestingly, the only other 
concerto Mozart wrote in a minor key.” Just as John hoped, everyone is 
impressed.  
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 There is obviously something criticisable about John’s assertion. It 
would be a mistake, though to say that what’s criticisable is that John didn’t 
really know what he asserted. John knew that what he said was true. After all, 
Wikipedia is very reliable source. If you are not convinced, just switch the 
details of the case and suppose that John consulted (under the table, with his 
iPhone) a peer-reviewed music journal. 
 What’s criticisable about John’s assertion is at least this: that John’s 
‘Googled assertion’ was a kind of bluff. By asserting what he did, John implied 
that he knew much more than he did, in this case, about Mozart. Bluffs, in 
poker and elsewhere, can be called. In order to call John’s bluff, all anyone 
needed to do was to ask John a quick follow-up question. John’s iPhone would 
have the answer to the follow-up question, but John (independent of the 
iPhone) would not.   
 
§2. 
The case of John can be used in the service of making two very different kinds 
of philosophical points about assertion. The point we will not try to make is 
one of a style that has been employed in recent work by Jennifer Lackey 
(2011). Consider that if John knows that p, and yet, John’s assertion appears to 
be epistemically criticisable in light of the implicature that John’s epistemic 
position is better than it is, then this looks very much like evidence against the 
sufficiency leg of the knowledge norm of assertion (e.g. Unger 1975; Williamson 
2000; DeRose 2002; Hawthorne 2004; Simion 2015)—according to which, 
knowledge is a sufficient epistemic credential to warrant assertion. 
 However, as recent work by Matthew Benton (2014) has shown, the 
strategy of moving from misleading implicatures1 about an asserter’s 
epistemic position relative to the asserted proposition, to the conclusion that 
                                                           
1 See Grice (1991). 
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the sufficiency thesis of the knowledge norm of assertion is false, is far from a 
straightforward road2. It’s not a road we’ll try to take here3.  
 Without weighing in on the issue of whether cases like John’s are 
evidence against the knowledge norm, we will simply take John’s epistemic 
bluff at face value in order to make a very different point altogether. In what 
follows, what we want to suggest that to the extent that John’s assertion is 
criticisable, it is so in virtue of details about the way in which John asserted on 
the basis of Googling the fact about Mozart in question. And this has to do with 
complexities about the relationship between the iPhone and John’s cognitive 
agency. If the argument we advance is right, then the epistemic criticisability 
of ‘Googled’ assertions like John’s varies dramatically, depending on how it is 
that the technology relied upon is integrated into the asserter’s cognitive 
architecture. More generally, we will show how recent thinking in the 
philosophy of mind and cognitive science has some surprising bearing on our 
assessments of the propriety of assertions.  
 
§3.  
Consider now the following pair of cases, due to Andy Clark and David 
Chalmers (1998), which form a familiar reference point in the contemporary 
literature on extended cognition in the philosophy of mind.  
 
Inga: Inga has a normally functioning biological memory. When she 
learns new information, she stores it in her biological memory (as is 
typical and familiar) and it is her biological memory which she consults 
when she needs old information.  
                                                           
2 Arguments to this effect would also have to establish that the impropriety is epistemic 
rather than merely a failure to satisfy a Gricean maxim (e.g., Goldberg 2013). Cf., Benton 
(2014a). 
3 See Carter and Gordon (2011, forthcoming) and McGlynn (2014) for critical 
discussions of the sufficiency leg of the knowledge norm of assertion.  
4 
 
 
Otto: Otto suffers from Alzheimer’s disease, and like many Alzheimer’s 
patients, he relies on information in the environment to help structure 
his life. Otto carries a notebook around with him everywhere he goes. 
When he learns new information, he writes it down. When he needs 
some old information, he looks it up. For Otto, his notebook plays the 
role usually played by a biological memory (1998, 8). 
 
First, a similarity, and then a dissimilarity. The most striking similarity 
between Otto and Inga is a functional one; both rely on something (a notebook 
and a biological brain, respectively) to play the functional role of information 
storage and retrieval. But there appears to be an important difference. The 
elephant in the room is that what’s playing this functional role for Otto is 
something in the world—outside of his head—a paper notebook, with which he 
is physically interacting. The traditional way of thinking about the case (e.g., 
Adams and Aizawa 2001; 2008; 2010; Rupert 2004) is familiar: that Inga in 
the former case is relying on her memory, but Otto in the latter is not4, even 
though the notebook plays a memory-like role for him. The notebook, after all, 
is not a constituent of Otto’s mental life. 
 According to proponents of extended cognition, however, this 
traditional diagnosis rests on ‘bioprejudice’. They suggest that, rather than to 
focus on material constitution or physical location, we should let the following 
‘parity’ principle guide our judgments of what counts as a part of an 
individual’s cognitive process5: 
                                                           
4 The primary argument which Adams and Aizawa have leveled against extended 
cognition is what they call the coupling constitution fallacy—viz., the alleged fallacy of 
moving from causal coupling of some object to a cognitive agent, to the conclusion that 
that object or process is part of the agent's cognitive processing. Cf., Clark (2010) for a 
reply.  
5 As Clark (2007) puts it, ‘the actual local operations that realize certain forms of human 
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Parity Principle:  If, as we confront some task, a part of the world 
functions as a process which, were it to go on in the head, we would 
have no hesitation in accepting as part of the cognitive process, then  
that part of the world is part of the cognitive process. 
 
With reference to the parity principle, it looks as though—given that Otto’s 
notebook is playing the same functional role vis-à-vis information storage and 
retrieval as is Inga’s biological brain—we should include Otto’s notebook as 
part of his memory provided we include Inga’s biological memory as part of 
her memory (which, of course, we do). 
 A familiar objection to this more egalitarian approach to the bounds of 
cognition is that too much is let in. As Sean Allen-Hermanson (2012) puts the 
worry: ‘If a notebook counts as part of one’s mind, then why not the yellow 
pages, the internet, or even parts of the natural world that supply information 
and support cognition?’ (2012, 792) In response to this kind of ‘slippery slope’ 
worry—the objection from cognitive bloat—Clark has put forward some 
additional integration conditions, which must be satisfied by external artifacts 
to be included within a cognitive process: 
 
Clark’s “Trust and Glue” Integration Conditions 
(1) “That the resource be reliably available and typically invoked.” 
(2) “That any information thus retrieved be more-or-less automatically 
endorsed. It should not usually be subject to critical scrutiny. [...] It 
                                                                                                                                                                       
cognizing include inextricable tangles of feedback, feed-forward and feed-around loops: 
loops that promiscuously criss-cross the boundaries of brain, body and world’ (Clark 
2007, §2) According to some more recent defences of extended cognition, especially due 
to Palermos (2011; 2014), the position can be motivated entirely with reference to 
dynamical systems theory (Beer 1995; 2000), without reference to the more standard 
functionalist argument from the parity principle.  
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should be deemed about as trustworthy as something retrieved clearly 
from biological memory.” 
(3) “That information contained in the resource should be easily 
accessible as and when required.” 
 
 While Otto’s notebook arguably satisfies these conditions, resources 
such as an almanac in one’s study which is only occasionally consulted, do not, 
and so—as this line of defence goes—the parity based rationale according to 
which we count Otto’s notebook as part of his memory needn’t also rule-in the 
almanac as part of your memory, simply because you’ve consulted it on 
occasion. Otto’s notebook satisfies cognitive integration conditions which the 
almanac, in cases of ordinary use, does not6. 
 Unsurprisingly, the hypothesis of extended cognition, is a controversial 
one7. It is beyond our present scope to argue conclusively for the view. Rather, 
we submit that the view is one which is gaining traction not only in the 
philosophy of mind, but also more recently in epistemology8, and further, that 
this view has some interesting applications (as we’ll see) in debates about 
assertion.  
 
 §4 
Let’s return to the dinner party, with John. Suppose that Otto, from Clark and 
Chalmers’ case, is present. Otto, coincidentally, has been watching 
documentaries on Mozart and has jotted down pages of facts in his notebook, 
                                                           
6 For a detailed discussion of cognitive integration conditions, and in particular, how 
cognitive integration matters with respect to extended knowledge-generating cognitive 
abilities, see Pritchard (2010). 
7 For a sample of recent essays for and against this thesis, see Menary (2010). 
8 See, for example, Carter (2013; forthcoming); Carter & Kallestrup (2016); Carter & 
Palermos (2015); Carter and Pritchard (forthcoming), Carter et al (2014); Clark (2015); 
Kelp (2013a); (2013b); Palermos (2014); (2015a); (2015b); Pritchard (2010); Vaesen 
(2011); (2013).  
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one fact of which he asserts as a natural follow-up to John’s remark: ‘Ah yes, 
Mozart left Paris a few months later, in September of that year, and travelled 
to Munich.’ We may suppose further (to retain similarities across the cases9) 
that Otto’s consultation of his notebook in this circumstance mirrored the 
discreetness of John’s consultation of his iPhone in the original case.  
 Let’s consider now some similarities between Otto’s assertion and 
John’s assertion, before noting some important differences. Regarding 
similarities: both Otto and John asserted on the basis of consulting non-
biologically stored information; neither disclosed this fact; both, by asserting, 
presented themselves to their interlocutors as knowing the asserted fact; and, 
crucially, given the specialised nature of the informational content of the 
assertion, each conversationally implied that they know further facts about 
Mozart’s life and music. 
 John’s assertion, from §1, was a clear case of epistemically criticisable 
bluffing—viz., bluffing because John did not know further facts about Mozart 
which he implied he did. What about Otto’s assertion—is it a case of 
epistemically criticisable bluffing, too? It seems, initially at least, that we must 
say yes. After all, John was bluffing precisely because he presented himself as 
knowing more than he actually did10. And, it looks very much as though Otto is 
equally guilty of generating the false implicature that he knows more about 
Mozart than he actually does. (After all, neither John nor Otto can answer a 
                                                           
9 See §6 for further discussion on this point.  
10 It is worth pointing out that bluffs can potentially be criticised on the basis of 
different kinds of reasons, some epistemic (which are the kinds of considerations at 
issue here) and others moral. In the moral case, for instance, it is noteworthy that bluffs 
typically involve some kind of intent to deceive, a feature that can incur moral 
disapprobation independent from epistemic evaluations of bluffing. Furthermore, it’s 
important to note that even if one asserts p with the intention of bluffing in the sense at 
issue in the cases described--viz., with the intention of communicating via implicature 
that one knows more than one actually does--one might in fact fail to bluff if one 
actually knows more than one takes oneself to know. Thanks to an anonymous referee 
at Philosophical Psychology for requesting clarification on this point.    
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single follow-up via appealing to biological memory). And yet, this diagnosis is 
not very satisfying.  
 To bring this point into sharp relief, suppose for instance that following 
each assertion, the relevant background facts were brought to light to all the 
interlocutors—viz., including facts about the roles that John’s iPhone and 
Otto’s notebook play in John’s and Otto’s processes of information storage and 
retrieval more generally, their history of interaction with their devices, etc. It 
seems as though the more facts are brought to light, the stronger the 
corresponding intuition that John’s assertion is criticisable in a way that Otto’s 
assertion is not, and that this is so despite the similarities between the two 
assertions noted above.  
 However, this intuition stands in tension with the explanation for why 
John’s epistemic bluff appeared to be criticisable: John’s assertion generated 
the misleading implicature that he knew more about Mozart than he actually 
did11. And, yet, even bringing all relevant facts to light, it looks as though 
Otto—no less than John—is guilty of generating the implicature that he (Otto) 
knew more than he did. Just as, if we asked John a follow-up question, he’d 
need to get out is iPhone, so if we asked Otto a follow-up question, he’d have to 
                                                           
11 According to Grice (e.g., 1975, 49-50) q is conversationally implied by a speaker’s 
utterance of p provided (i) the speaker is presumed to be a cooperative speaker; that 
(ii) in order to maintain this assumption it must be presumed that the speaker believes 
that q, and that (iii) the speaker takes it that both speaker and hearer mutually know 
that the hearer can work out that to preserve the assumption that the speaker is 
cooperative, q is in fact required (cf., for discussion, Levinson 1983, 113 and Hirschberg 
1985, §2). Further, any speaker is being cooperative (as per (i)) only if respecting the 
Maxim of Quality, according to which one must not say false things, or things for which 
one lacks good evidence. Misleading implicatures of the sort given by John violate this 
maxim, for the assumption that John is a cooperative speaker is maintained only if it is 
also presumed that John really does know other items on the topic on which he asserted 
a specific piece of ‘quasi-expert’ information, and this is something that both John and 
his audience plausibly know that the audience can work out. Thanks to a referee at 
Philosophical Psychology for requesting clarification on this point.  
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get out his notebook.  
 
§5.  
The hypothesis of extended cognition offers a neat way to resolve the tension 
noted in the previous section. The diagnosis, in short, goes as follows: while 
both John and Otto, by asserting as they did, generate the implicature that 
each knows quite a bit more about Mozart, John’s implicature is false and 
Otto’s is true. That is why John’s assertion is criticisable in a way Otto’s is not. 
And this is so even though neither can tell you anything further about Mozart 
without consulting an external artefact. Otto has additional extended 
knowledge, but John does not. 
 What makes the difference between generating a false implicature and a 
true implicature, is whether each does know other things about Mozart.  And, 
given that each has the information externally stored, the crux of the matter is 
that only if either possesses additional extended knowledge, information 
stored outside the biological brain, about Mozart does either generate a true 
implicature that either knows further information on the topic. And it is with 
reference to the hypothesis of extended cognition that we have a principled 
reason to think that Otto does plausibly have such knowledge, and John does 
not. And this is because, on the extended cognition programme, of an 
important difference in cognitive integration in the two cases.  
 To appreciate this point, it will be helpful to compare both John and Otto 
with Lilah, who is also at the dinner party:  
 
Lilah: Suppose Lilah habitually and automatically stores all of her 
appointments and deadlines onto her Google calendar, which is very 
readily accessible on an external device—a smart watch—that she takes 
everywhere she goes. While John and Otto are talking about Mozart, 
another of the dinner party guests asks Lilah when she’ll be giving her 
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talk at next week’s workshop. She doesn’t have this information—or for 
that matter any other information about her appointments—stored in 
biological memory, and so discreetly glances at her smart watch and says 
‘Wednesday at 3:30 p.m., on the first floor, room 1.17”.  
 
Lilah isn’t that different from many of us. After all, people nowadays rarely 
rely primarily on their biological memories12 for information storage and 
retrieval of this nature13. Furthermore, Lilah produces very specific 
information about her lecture location, and almost immediately, in a way that 
is suggestive of a general competence with this kind of information.  
 Of course, Lilah has none of this information in her head. (Asked a 
follow-up, Lilah would no less than John or Otto need to consult her gadget, 
without which she would be hopeless.) Lilah is intuitively, however, not 
criticisable, in light of generating a misleading implicature that she knows 
more than she does; she is, intuitively, not bluffing. And this is so even though 
her assertion is suggestive of her knowing the details of her schedule, details 
that are simply not in her head.  
 Extended cognition can explain all of this: Otto’s assertion and Lilah’s 
assertion are not criticisable—even though John’s is—because Otto and Lilah  
do know further things about the topic in question. This is so even though the 
information is not in their heads but in, with reference to extended cognition, 
their extended memory.  With reference to Clark’s ‘glue and trust’ integration 
                                                           
12 For work that illustrates the types of memory limitations that offloading can help us 
overcome, see e.g. Simons and Levin (1997) and Cowan (2010). 
13 See Lynch (2014) for an overview of the cognitive offloading trend, and see e.g. Risko 
(2014) and Chu & Kita (2011) for evidence that cognitive offloading improves 
performance not just with respect to memory but also perception and spatial reasoning.  
Meanwhile, see Risko and Gilbert (2016) for an exploration of the social and cognitive 
consequences of cognitive offloading, and for a review of how this behavior is seemingly 
triggered by internal cognitive demands associated with a task. Thanks to an 
anonymous referee at Philosophical Psychology for pointing out the relevance of this 
empirical literature. 
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conditions, note that Otto’s and Lilah’s gadgets are cognitively integrated in a 
way that John’s is not, despite some superficial similarities. This point needs 
some unpacking.  
 Note, firstly, that in both the case of Otto and Lilah, their interaction with 
their external devices is automatic and seamless, uncritical, and (as Clark puts 
it,) ‘transparent’ as is consulting biological memory. In the case of John, by 
contrast, what we have is a kind of deliberate action—one which takes ‘two 
steps’: a plan and an action. 
 As Clark (2010b) has noted, ‘Otto is so used to using the book that he 
accesses it automatically when bio-memory fails. It is transparent equipment 
for him just as biological memory is for Inga.’ And this is the case for Lilah as 
well, whose consultation of her smart watch (and inscription in it) is second 
nature for her.  
 The point about cognitive integration can be made, likewise, with 
respect to dynamical systems theory (e.g., Beer 1995; 2000; Chemero 2009, 
Froese et al. 2013, Sutton et al. 2008, Theiner et al. 2010, Tollefsen & Dale 
2011, Palermos 2014b), according to which, in order to claim that two (or 
more) systems give rise to an overall extended, or coupled, system, this 
requires non-linear relations that arise out of mutual interactions between the 
contributing parts14. As Palermos (2011; 2014a; 2014b) has noted, on the 
basis of dynamical systems theory, we are in a position to claim that, in order 
to have an extended cognitive system (i.e., Otto and his notebook; Lilah and 
her calendar), all we need is that the internal and external parts interact 
mutually with each other, and the existence of such processes of mutual 
interactions is a requirement that goes unsatisfied in the case of John and his 
phone.   
                                                           
14 For an expanded discussion on this point, see Carter, Gordon and Palermos (2015). 
The application of dynamical systems theory to the epistemology of extended cognition 
has been developed primarily by Palermos.  
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 Putting this all together: initially, it seem utterly mysterious why some 
cases of asserting on the basis of information not stored in one’s head (but 
rather, stored in a gadget) are, intuitively, cases of epistemic bluffing and 
others aren’t. John, Otto and Lilah all make assertions that generate the 
implicature that they possess further background knowledge which none of 
them actually has in their heads, but rather on external devices. Yet, John’s 
assertion is intuitively criticisable in a way that Otto’s and Lilah’s isn’t. As 
we’ve seen, extended cognition can neatly explain this. In short, if extended 
cognition is true, John is bluffing, but Otto and Lilah are not. His implicature 
that he possesses further knowledge on the topic is false, and theirs is true.  
  
§6 Objections and replies 
 
Objection: What work is the inconspicuousness of consulting the external 
artifacts doing, exactly, in these cases? More specifically: why is it built in to 
the cases discussed that John, Otto and Lilah are being discreet in their 
consultation of the device when asserting on the basis of it?  Why not just 
make these cases where the individuals consult their external storage devices 
in front of their interlocutors? 
 
Reply: Nondiscreetness would cancel the relevant implicatures. Consider that, 
in the circumstances, as described, John is clearly bluffing, but Otto and Lilah 
aren’t, and this was a phenomenon that needed explaining (given that none 
uses their brains for information storage on the topic). However, if (for 
example), John was entirely transparent about getting the information from 
his phone, he would no longer be bluffing. This is because his making explicit 
the source of his assertion would cancel the implicature that he is 
knowledgeable on the topic of Mozart. The interesting case, then, is the 
discreet case, one where John is bluffing but (with reference to extended 
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cognition) Otto and Lilah, equally discreet, are not, as they generate an 
implicature (that they are knowledgeable on the respective topics) that, unlike 
John’s, is true.   
 
Objection: Even if the Clark/Chalmers line is right, and Otto’s and Lilah’s 
notebook and phone, respectively, function as a kind of extended memory for 
each, why should we grant that what they have is extended knowledge? This 
seems to matter, given that their assertions are claimed to generate the 
implicature that they are knowledgeable about the respective topics. But this 
implicature could still be false, even if they have extended memory, if the 
status of the information stored in their external devices falls short of 
knowledge.  
 
Reply: This is right; if Otto and Lilah do not have extended knowledge, then 
like John, they generate false implicatures. We can imagine tweaks on these 
cases where they (like John) fail to have extended knowledge, even if the 
information stored in their external devices is, by the lights of extended 
cognition, part of their extended memory. For example, if a jokester tampered 
with Otto’s notebook, switching around the dates corresponding with Mozart’s 
Sonata’s, then even if the jokester accidentally switched the dates back to the 
right order, the information is Otto’s notebook is not extended knowledge; the 
‘knowledge’ is Gettiered15. Thus, extended memory without extended 
knowledge is certainly possible. However, if we embrace the extended 
cognition reading of the cases discussed, there is no obvious epistemic 
asymmetry that would justify a difference in epistemic assessment in the 
extended cases relative to biological counterpart versions of these cases. (As 
soon as we attempt to point to various possibilities of error, for Otto and Lilah, 
                                                           
15 See Gettier (1963). For a discussion of Gettier cases for extended cognition, see Carter 
(2013). Cf. Jarvis (2015). 
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the proponent of extended cognition can note point out that if the possibilities 
of error are greater than they would be were they to rely on normally 
functioning biological memory, then these aren’t bona fide cases of extended 
cognition, as the cases would fail to satisfy the parity principle16). 
 
Objection: Let’s suppose that the Clark and Chalmers reading of the Otto case is 
right, and further that we accept that Otto counts as knowing what is in his 
notebook, and Lilah the information in her smart watch calendar. What if John 
interacted with his iPhone, for the purposes of Googling, in a way that was as 
automatic as the way Otto and Lilah consult their external devices. Imagine, 
for example, a twist on the original case of John, where we hold fixed all details 
except tweak (dramatically) the extent to which John’s iPhone is cognitively 
integrated, vis-à-vis, Googling. John never attempts to store information in 
biological memory and always automatically Googles a range of trusted sites, 
in a way that is as fluid and transparent as the way Otto automatically consults 
his notebook. In such a circumstance, might John not be bluffing, when he 
makes a comment of the sort which he is described as making in §1? Might he 
count as having extended knowledge?  
 
Reply: This depends importantly on two things. Firstly, how we fill out further 
details of the case, and secondly, which philosophical rationale for extended 
cognition one is embracing: commonsense functionalism or dynamical 
                                                           
16 See also Pritchard (2010) and Palermos (2014; 2015b) for arguments to the effect 
that satisfying cognitive integrations for extended cognition is at the same time to 
satisfy the epistemological conditions requisite for one’s externally aided belief forming 
process to qualify as a knowledge-generating cognitive ability. On Pritchard and 
Palermos’s line, note that knowledge doesn’t require that one’s correctness be primarily 
creditable to one’s cognitive ability (cf., Greco 2003; 2010; Sosa 2009) but just that the 
correctness of one’s belief be significantly creditable to one’s exercise of cognitive 
ability. In this way, Pritchard and Palermos are distancing themselves from robust 
virtue epistemologists such as Greco and Sosa. For related discussion, see Kallestrup 
and Pritchard (2012; 2013) 
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systems theory (see §5). Even if John seems to satisfy Clark and Chalmers’ 
parity principle (which is not clear17), he fails extended cognition conditions 
according to dynamical systems theory (e.g., Palermos 2014) so long as there 
are not—as there are in the cases of Otto and Lilah—feedback loops between 
John and the device he is using to Google. In short, if the direction of causation 
is primarily ‘one-way’, from Google to John, then he fails to count as mutually 
interacting with the source of the information like Otto and Lilah are—i.e., 
where it is second nature to be affecting their source, by continually updating 
it. However, we can imagine an idiosyncratic kind of Googling where such 
feedback loops are more plausibly present than they are in the original case. 
Suppose, for instance, that the site John queries on his phone is a collaborative 
music Wiki, such as classical.net, which allows users to update and edit 
content18.  Suppose further that John constantly updates the site, has been 
doing so for a long time, is familiar with the entries, goes to the site 
automatically, etc. In such a scenario, John is arguably much closer to 
satisfying the feedback loop condition, under dynamical systems theory, than 
he does in the version of the case described in §1. More generally, on the 
extended cognition approach, the question of whether an external artefact 
should be included within an individual’s cognitive process is always going to 
be underdetermined in light of facts about the material constitution of the 
gadget or whether a particular kind of search engine is used. What matters in 
the main is cognitive integration, which can’t be settled without looking 
closely at the details about the gadget’s functional role and the way the agent 
typically interacts with it.  
 
§7 Concluding remarks  
                                                           
17 After all, even if information storage and retrieval vis-à-vis one’s biological memory is 
the intracranial functional analogue of Otto’s process of consulting the notebook, it’s not 
clear what the intracranial analogue process is to Googling.  
18 http://www.classical.net 
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As cognitive offloading increases, we can expect an influx in assertions that are 
based on the information stored in our gadgets rather than in our heads. Some 
of these assertions are properly criticisable; they can—as with the case of John 
in §1—generate the false implicature that that the asserter is more 
knowledgeable on the topic of the assertion than the asserter actually is. 
Interestingly, though, other gadget-assisted assertions which do not draw 
from any information stored in our heads nonetheless do not seem criticisable, 
and this is so even when such assertions generate the very same implicature 
that the asserter is knowledgeable and competent on the topic in question. 
While this is a genuine puzzle for those who embrace traditional thinking 
about the bounds of cognition, we’ve shown how the resources of extended 
cognition provide a neat solution. More generally, we hope to have shown a 
straightforward way in which recent thinking in the philosophy of mind and 
cognitive science can cut some ice in discussions about assertoric norms19. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
19 The authors would like to thank S. Orestis Palermos, Mona Simion and Duncan 
Pritchard for helpful discussion. Gordon’s research in connection with this paper has 
benefitted from the ‘Intellectual Humility MOOC’ grant funded by the John Templeton 
Foundation, hosted at the University of Edinburgh’s Eidyn research centre.  
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